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Die Another Day? Budget
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In January 2002, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
projected that the federal government, operating under current
fiscal policies, would run a cumulative budget surplus of about
$2.25 trillion for fiscal years 2003-12. By August, this pro-
jected surplus had been cut in half, and the CBO now projects
modest deficits (averaging less than 1 percent of GDP) through
fiscal year 2005. (In fiscal year 2002, the unified budget deficit
totaled $157 billion, with a deficit of $145 billion projected
for 2003.) 
The swing from projected budget surpluses to actual
budget deficits has led some economists to warn of the
economic consequences of a return to deficit financing.
Indeed, Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan has argued
that larger budget deficits may lead to higher interest rates
and, as a consequence, slower growth of investment and labor
productivity.1 These warnings are particularly relevant given
proposed new legislation for a Medicare drug prescription
plan and extension of the expiring tax provisions in the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001. 
The classic argument is that large deficits raise interest
rates because government borrowing “crowds out” private
borrowing. As the government competes with private bor-
rowers to take a larger share of a fixed pool of saving, the
real interest rate rises. Conversely, rising surpluses should
be expected to lower interest rates.
Empirically, the linkage between budget deficits/surpluses
and interest rates is weak, as a series of papers published in
the 1980s showed.2 However, most large macroeconometric
forecasting models presume that larger deficits lead to higher
interest rates. The past five years provide a natural experiment
to test this hypothesis. After all, sharply larger surpluses were
projected until 2001, with much smaller projected surpluses
thereafter (and even modest-sized deficits over the near term). 
The figure provides some countervailing evidence against
the view that real interest rates move inversely to large changes
in the federal government’s projected budget balance. The
figure plots the CBO’s biannual 10-year cumulative surplus
projections against the yield on 10-year (on-the-run) Treasury
Inflation-Indexed Securities (TIIS), which the Treasury began
issuing in 1997. As the figure shows, projections of ever larger
budget surpluses from 1997:Q3 to 2001:Q1 were essentially
associated with rising real interest rates, not falling rates. From
1997:Q1 to 2000:Q1, the yield on the 10-year TIIS rose from
3.36 percent to 4.23 percent. Since then, 10-year TIIS yields
have fallen to just under 2.5 percent, as has the size of the
projected cumulative budget surpluses. 
The evidence presented here suggests that changes in the
economy’s expected growth rate greatly affect both projected
surpluses and real interest rates. When economic growth is
expected to be strong, particularly labor productivity and
investment, the return to capital (the real rate of interest) is
thus high, as is the growth of taxable incomes (and hence tax
receipts). When growth slows, the opposite tends to occur.
Large budget deficits or surpluses may affect interest rates,
but other factors appear to be more important.
—Kevin L. Kliesen
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NOTE: TIIS yields are daily averages for the quarter indicated.
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